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Anotacija
Straipsnyje analizuojamas empirinių mokslų, ypač fizikos, sąlytis su krikščioniš-
kąja teologija, filosofija ir apskritai humanitariniais mokslais. Šiandienos mokslo 
pasaulyje dažnai atrodo, kad gamtos ir tikslieji mokslai nepripažįsta krikščionybės 
teiginių, sunkiai priima Apreiškimo tiesas. Teisingas abiejų sričių ir krypčių mokslų 
dialogas turėtų remtis abipuse pagarba, pagrindžiant savus mokslo tyrinėjimo meto-
dus, teiginius ir aksiomas. Ginti teologiją reikėtų pradėti, nurodant tam tikrus fizikos 
trūkumus ir suformulavus filosofinę šių trūkumų kontrolę. Tai reiškia, kad fizika, o ne 
teologija, tampa „iš naujo peržiūrima realybe“. Tik „kontroliuojama“ fizika gerąja 
prasme ir teologija yra tinkami diskusijų partneriai, kurie ieško autentiškos tiesos. 
Šio straipsnio autorius yra katalikas, bet jo išsakytos idėjos priimtinos ir stačia-
tikiams, ir liuteronams, galimi skirtumai tik dėl natūraliosios teologijos požiūrių 
įvairovės.
PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: fizika, krikščionybė, teologija. 
Abstract
A short description of the relationship between Physics, Philosophy and Theology is: 
Physics neglects or passes by Natural Realism, which is the origin of Philosophy. In 
turn, Natural Realism is backed up by Judeo-Christian revelation. Therefore, Phys-
ics neglects or passes by Theology. That relationship between Physics and Theology 
is widely used as a background for exercising an intense pressure on Theology. The 
defence of Theology should begin by pointing out certain shortcomings of Physics 
and formulating a philosophical control of these shortcomings. This is tantamount to 
turning Physics instead of Theology into a “site under construction”. Only a “con-
trolled” Physics and Theology are adequate discussion partners. The author of this 
article is a Catholic. However, the ideas expressed are, by and large, acceptable for 
Orthodox and Lutheran Christians as well, with possible differences only regarding 
natural theology.
KEY WORDS: Physic, Christianity, theology. 
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Introduction
Most probably, the first reaction to the title ‘Why is it not so easy for a 
present-day physicist to be genuinely a Christian?’ is bewilderment or discon-
cert. One might rather think that the beautiful laws of nature discovered by 
physicists, together with their success in describing natural processes, should 
help their discoverers to notice the creative mind that shines up in them. In 
fact, the observed order and intelligibility of nature give rise to a classical 
and, so to speak very popular, argument for the Creator. In St. Thomas Aqui-
nas’s account of cosmological arguments for the existence of the Creator, it 
is called the quinta via. But, as a sociological fact, physicists are not inclined 
to notice the creative mind in the laws of nature, and less so by means of 
their professional education and work. Rather, many physicists are atheists 
or agnostics. And many people, who have been raised in a Christian family, 
no matter whether Catholic, Orthodox or Lutheran, have become estranged, 
precisely because of exercising their profession as physicists, from the faith 
of their youth without becoming declared atheists or agnostics.
Here is an incomplete list with the names of some widely known phy-
sicists and their religious affiliation. Only very few first-line physicists are 
declared Christians, including Pascual Jordan (Jordan, 1968), Max Planck 
and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker; all of them Lutherans. Some others rela-
te friendly towards Christianity, such as Max Born and Werner Heisenberg. 
There is a certain number of second-line physicists who declare themselves 
Christians, mainly evangelical or lutheran, above all in the US. Second-line 
physicists who declare themselves Catholics, are not so frequent, such as 
Stephen Barr, University of Delaware, co-founder of the US-based Society 
of Catholic Scientists (SCS) (Barr, 2016). Similarly Michael B. Dennin, Uni-
versity of California – Irvine (Dennin, 2015). Quite a few first-line physicists 
are declared atheists including, but not limited to, Niels Bohr, Max Delbrück, 
Paul Dirac, Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, Peter Higgs, Stephen Haw-
king, Carlo Rovelli, Erwin Schrödinger and Steven Weinberg.
It seems that the quinta via “does not work” any longer. Physics and other 
natural sciences seem to have replaced Religion. In other words, the cathedrals 
of our time are not any more the real cathedrals of St. Peter, or St. John in Late-
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ran, or St. Mary, or St. James, or Christ the Saviour. The names of the contem-
poranean cathedrals are CERN in Geneva, DESY in Hamburg, DUBNA in 
Moscow, almost all university hospitals, Enrico Fermi-Laboratory in Chicago, 
Jacques Monod-Institute of Fundamental Biology in Paris, Albert Einstein-Ins-
titute for Gravitational Physics in Hannover/Potsdam, and so on.As to Biology, 
suffice it to say that the dominant spirit in almost all university departments of 
Biology is materialistic, and as such opposed to any religious belief.
To the spirit dominant in natural sciences, one has to add their influence 
in the life of society. The technological results of the natural sciences, their 
influence on economy, finances and politics make them a focus of public 
interest. No wonder that in almost every country exist journals for the popu-
larization of science such as “Scientific American”, “Science” and their trans-
lations in other languages plus the home-production of such journals. There 
are also TV-series such as “BBC-CrowdScience”, and on many products one 
can find a remark like “scientifically tested”. In comparison to that, initiatives 
for the “popularization of Religion” have great difficulties. It is not at all 
exaggerated to say that our western civilization is more and more a scientific-
technological one and lesser and lesser a philosophical-religious one.
After this first overview, let us define our way to answer the question 
‘Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a Christian?’ 
The first element is that we confine ourselves to Physics. The second step of 
defining our way to answer the question is to not focus on persons and their 
beliefs, but on doctrines and their harmony or lack of harmony. That means 
for the answer to our main question “Why is it not so easy for a present-day 
physicist to be genuinely a Christian?” that we disregard personal attitudes, 
which might have grown out of personal life circumstances. We are looking 
for a non-individual, theoretical reason, why it is not so easy... In fact, the 
focussing on doctrines makes it easier to single out precisely one aspect in 
which both branches of knowledge – Physics and Catholic Theology – should 
be in harmony with each other. The fact is that they are not. Accordingly, an 
individual physicist would have to host in his mind two doctrines that are so-
mehow opposed. So, we will focus on the question, why Physics and Catholic 
theology are not in harmony in the area, where they should be.
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Focusing on doctrines and their relationship means also that the particular 
physical problems are only important insofar they substantiate the metho-
dology of Physics in a particular case. Therefore, the theory of Big-Bang, 
the question of the age of the Universe, the age of the Earth, the formation 
of galaxies and our planetary system, and others are secondary. Likewise, 
comparisons with particular statements of the Bible, such as the details of 
the Flood, are of no interest in our context. Also historical questions like the 
Galilei-affair are irrelevant. Our task is really centred on the present day state 
of doctrines and their methodological properties.
The third and last step of defining the way of answering our question is 
to determine where precisely Physics and Catholic Theology should be in 
harmony. (Please remember: what will be said here in the name of Catholic 
Theology, is acceptable, with the possible exception of natural theology, for 
Orthodox and Lutheran Theology as well.) Now, the point of harmony cannot 
be God, for Physics does not speak about God. The point of harmony cannot 
be either the particular laws of nature, for Theology does not deal with them. 
Yet, Theology speaks about the things of our world in a way that can be la-
bled as ‘common sense’ plus the concept of creating. ‘Creating’ lies outside 
our experience, but is linked to Common Sense by precisely the way of rea-
soning that is called ‘natural theology’.
A more philosophical name for ‘common sense’ is ‘Natural Realism’. It 
refers to the way of thinking that can be found everywhere throughout antiquity 
until the high Middle Ages. Thereafter it is confined to the philosophical tradi-
tions which have maintained that way of thinking such as Aristotelians, Tho-
mists, also a certain group of Phenomenologists, to mention the main currents. 
On the other hand, Rationalists and Empiricists, Kantians and most Analytic 
philosophers would group themselves more or less apart from Natural Realism.
In the following we explain the relevant details of speaking about the 
material things of our world, as is done in Physics. Taking into account that 
Physics has grown out from the old philosophy of nature, which in turn “mo-
ves” within Natural Realism, we outline also the basic features of Natural 
Realism. Then we examine briefly also the Catholic view of how Christian 
revelation speaks about material things (II). In a nutshell, the result will be 
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that the mindset of Physics is not in harmony with that of Natural Realism, 
but the mindset of Natural Realism is in harmony with the mindset in Cat-
holic Theology, when the latter speaks about our material world. This means 
that we have already answered somehow the initial question of “Why is it not 
so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a Christian?”
But we have to take into account another fact not yet mentioned: there is 
a pressure on Theology, understood as a discipline that expounds Christian re-
velation. That pressure is exercised by people who seem to be convinced that 
Science has the stronger arguments (III.). Such a pressure is unjustifiable and 
we have to consider, therefore, also what can be done in order to diminish 
that pressure. It turns out that this task must be, and can be, carried out in the 
mindset of Natural Realism. The result would be a philosophical control of 
the methodical losses of Physics performed in order to match material things 
with mathematical models. This would be a substantial contribution to bringing 
Physics back into harmony with Catholic Theology (IV.), so that only a Physics 
equipped with that control is an adequate discussion partner for Theology.
1. State of affairs: Physics, Philosophy, Theology
1.1. Physics
In our context, the key words are success, model and reductionism. The su-
ccess of Physics is known to everybody: from the simplest machines like balan-
ces and carriages to computers, telephones, nanotechnology and heavy industries, 
cars, ships, aeroplanes and spaceships. It is quite understandable that many people 
are fascinated by such achievements. Accordingly, it is understandable that a who-
le civilization is built on technology which, in turn, is based on science. Therefore, 
industry, economy, even military defence have deeply shaped our mindset.
On a more directly scientific level, should be mentioned the two great 
theories of the 20th century: the theories of Special and General Relativity, on 
the one hand, and the Quantum theory, on the other. Here are some key words 
that accompany these theories: the equivalence of mass and energy, which 
is at the root of atomic bombs (by both fission and fusion), the equivalence 
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of heavy and inert mass, gravitational waves, for the theories of Relativity. 
And for Quantum theory, atomic spectra, superconductivity and suprafluidity, 
elementary particles and their the so called electromagnetic, weak and strong 
interactions. The chain of successes can be expected to continue.
Now, what is the key to such successes? The answer consists in one concept 
expressed in two words: mathematical models. Here we have united in one 
concept both the greatness and the limitation of Physics. The greatness has just 
been sketched by some successes. Let me illustrate, by means of the definition 
of model, the limitation. The definition of model stems from the physicist Hein-
rich Hertz (1857–1894), who could even be called the father of the concept 
‘model’. He relates external objects and certain mental (internal) images and 
imposes furthermore a certain condition on those images. He wrote his defini-
tion about 120 years ago, but the central idea continues also nowadays being 
the same: “The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which 
our conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation 
of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in accordance with 
such anticipation. In endeavouring thus to draw inferences as to the future from 
the past, we always adopt the following process. We form for ourselves images 
[innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; and the form which we 
give them is such that” – now comes the first key passage – “the necessary 
consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary 
consequents in nature of the things pictured” (Hertz, 1899, p. 1).
Here we have clearly expressed the motivation for making models: to pre-
dict events or processes. And to predict not just in order to know, but in order to 
be able to act now in prevision of what is going to happen later. It is this what 
makes possible machines, because if future events can be controlled by making 
suitable arrangements in the present moment, you can let the process doing its 
work “alone”, because you already know the result. In other words, the most 
interesting property of Physics is, in Hertz’s eyes, that it can produce practical 
results, not just knowledge. After having introduced the notion of model, he 
goes on mentioning some of there properties, among others the following:
“…The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of things. 
With the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, 
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namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned, requirement. For our purpose it is 
not necessary that they should be in conformity with the things in any other 
respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means 
of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity with them 
in any other than this one fundamental respect” – and here comes the second 
key passage – “The images which we may form of things are not determined 
without ambiguity by the requirement that the consequents of the images 
must be the images of the consequents” (Hertz, 1899, p. 2).
Altogether, physical models are considered to be not uniquely determined 
by the material reality they are supposed to picture. Therefore, they also re-
flect the genius of the model maker and not only the reality of the material 
things involved. The model of a process is successful in the sense that it pre-
dicts the development of that process.
Even though Hertz does not mention it, the experimental practice shows 
without exception that prediction is possible only up to a relative precision. 
This relative precision can be good, high or even excellent. ‘Relatively precise’ 
can mean ‘exact with a margin of 2% deviation’, or of 0,2% deviation, or of 
0,02% deviation – but of a deviation anyway. Relative precision can vary over 
a range and, thus, is not identical with truth. A model’s success might be true, 
but that does not mean that the model is true. The reason is that it does not make 
sense to say that a model is ‘more or less true’ or ‘true within certain margins’.
The bifurcation between truth and success (allowing for little deviations) 
makes that understanding a model is not the same as understanding the cor-
responding natural things. It is not possible to substitute success for truth or 
vice versa. Instead of one criterion for judging a discourse in Physics, one 
has now two criteria which never coincide. Because of that gap, the episte-
mological climate of Physics becomes “foggy” or even dark. It can only be 
brightened up when one achieves an understanding of the link between natu-
ral things and the pertinent model that goes beyond the category of success.
To the “darkening of the epistemological climate” of physics exists another 
contribution stemming from abstractions, idealizations and simplifications. 
They are very often carried out in order to make the models manageable in a 
practical way. It is the stated intention to leave the “main effect” untouched, the 
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latter being judged according to the rules of art, from the perspective of exist-
ing models. Of course, this does not change the reality experienced, but only 
the model from the physicist’s side. In other words, the reality is independent 
of the model. Nevertheless, the abstractions, idealizations and simplifications 
make that the full reality must be described with fewer elements. The incom-
pleteness emerging here may then be bridged by hypotheses. Precisely this is 
the additional darkening of the epistemological climate.
The idea of making models is not only supported by the desire of being 
able to arrange our present affairs in accordance with a model that antici-
pates the consequences of present actions. The philosophical tradition shaped 
by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in particular its epistemological aspects, is 
very likely to have supported the making of models, because it claims that 
knowledge of natural things stems, by and large, from man himself. In order 
to substantiate that, we need only recall some key quotations from Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason: “Although all our knowledge begins with experi-
ence, that doesn’t mean that it all comes from experience” (Kant, 1787, B1). 
For “[t]he order and regularity in appearances, which we call Nature, are put 
there by ourselves. We could never find them in appearances if it weren’t that 
we, or the nature of our mind, had first put them there” (Kant, 1781, A125).
And a little bit later, another reference to the copernican turn: “Even though 
it might seem counterintuitive, the understanding isn’t a mere power of for-
mulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of 
Nature. It’s only through the understanding that Nature exists at all!.. Nature 
is the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules. And 
appearances can’t exist outside us – they exist only in our sensibility. Thus, 
Nature (…) is possible only in the unity of self-awareness” (Kant, 1781, A127).
In fact, it is known from Hertz’s diaries that he was an avid reader of 
Kant’s writings. The same is true with respect to Einstein. Therefore, it is 
likely that their views in Physics were influenced by Kant’s thinking. It is 
not surprising, then, that the epistemological climate in Physics in general 
has become increasingly Kantian. This leads to a sort of exchange of roles: 
it is not any more the real world only that determines the properties of the 
model, but it is the model that increasingly determines what the real material 
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world should be like. The genius of the model maker becomes more and more 
important.
This change is reflected in the concept of ‘theory-ladenness of experience’ 
which, in our context, can be characterized by saying that the experiences 
or observations are affected by the theories held by the observer or experi-
menter. This idea – although not the word – is contained in the following text, 
written by Karl Popper (1902–1994) in 1935: “Even the careful and sober 
testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by ideas: experiment 
is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not stumble 
upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, 
we have to be active: we have to ‘make’ our experiences. It is we who always 
formulate the questions to be put to nature; it is we who try again and again 
to put these questions so as to elicit a clear-cut ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (for nature does 
not give an answer unless pressed for it). And in the end, it is again we who 
give the answer, it is we ourselves who, after severe scrutiny, decide upon the 
answer to the question we put to nature” (Popper, 2002, p. 280).
A contemporary voice confirms that the idea of theory-ladenness of ex-
periences continues being influential. The following passages stem from Ste-
phen Hawking (1942–2018) and represent, by and large, the mindset of the 
overwhelming majority of physicists. The two first paragraphs show, how 
models might carry the model maker from the observed “real reality” away 
to a theory-shaped reality, i.e. to theory-laden observations. The last sentence 
shows that it is only a small step from the theory-ladenness of observations to 
the theory-createdness of observations.
A contemporary voice confirms that the idea of theory-ladenness of ex-
periences continues being influential. The following passages stem from the 
late Stephen Hawking (1942–2018) and represent, by and large, the mindset 
of the overwhelming majority of physicists. The two first paragraphs show, 
how models might carry the model maker from the observed “real reality” 
away to a theory-shaped reality, i.e. to theory-laden observations. The last 
sentence shows that it is only a small step from the theory-ladenness of ob-
servations to the theory-createdness of observations: “There is no picture- or 
theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we adopt a view that we call 
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model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a 
model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the 
elements of the model to observations” (Hawking, 2010, p. 42) The author 
continues: “According to the idea of model-dependent realism… our brains 
interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the outside 
world. We form mental concepts of our home, trees, other people, the elec-
tricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and other universes. 
These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-
independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates 
a reality of its own” (Hawking, 2010, p. 172). “Your reality depends on the 
model you employ” (Hawking, 2010, p. 175).
Now, if models were only meant to construct machines or bring about 
other products of engineering, the ranking of success before mere knowledge 
would be perfectly legitimate. It is really astonishing how successful this 
method work, even after all the severe interventions of the physicist, which 
we have pinpointed so far with the concepts of ‘success’ and ‘model’. Some 
explanations about reductionisms will follow in due course. Engineering and 
Creation are not at all at odds; on the contrary, the manifest reality of enginee-
ring convincingly show, how well the Creator has formed material things and 
the genius of the human mind. That situation would not only be compatible 
with, but part of Common Sense or Natural Realism. In fact, the first pas-
sage of Hertz quoted seems to point precisely to that direction (of practical 
possibilities). However, the second passage of Hertz quoted reflect clearly 
the skepticism inherited by Kant and, therefore, seems to claim that natural 
things are just precisely that what the model says they are.
In other words, if the models are claimed to tell how things really are, 
then it is obvious that the question is not about engineering, but about man’s 
relationship to reality at all. And this is a philosophical stance. Therefore, it 
is necessary to sharply distinguish between the point of view of engineer-
ing, on the one hand, and of philosophy, on the other. As a matter of fact, the 
dominating mindset among physicists and in society in general is inclining 
to conflate or mix the engineering stance with the philosophical one and say: 
Because a model is successful, it must be true. This opinion is not limited to 
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professional physicists, but spreads through school education and the many 
programmes for the popularization of science to all members of society. 
However, such a mindset has little to do with Common Sense.
Now, what about reductionisms. the third key word in the context of the 
intellectual climate of Physics? Here, the practical character of Physics plays 
a dominant role, because reductionisms determine, above all, the performing 
of experiments. Physics relies on experiments in order to substantiate the 
success of a model. At the same time, the design of experiments needs more 
and more sophisticated models. Here we have a sort of self-consistent circle, 
where theoretical and practical elements form an inseparable amalgam. The 
history of Physics shows that such a self-consistent circle is rather stable, 
while compatible with development and even major “paradigm shifts”. But 
not even such “paradigm shifts” have substantially altered that being interwo-
ven of theory and experiment, so that it seems almost impossible to crack that 
circle and to attempt a sort of internal reform of Physics.
Now, what about reductionisms, the third key word in the context of the 
intellectual climate of Physics? Here, the practical character of Physics plays 
a dominant role, because reductionisms determine, above all, the performing 
of experiments. Physics relies on experiments in order to substantiate the 
success of a model. At the same time, the design of experiments needs more 
and more sophisticated models. Here we have a sort of self-consistent circle, 
where theoretical and practical elements form an unseparable amalgam. The 
history of Physics shows that such a selfconsistent circle is rather stable, 
while compatible with development and even major “paradigm shifts”. But 
not even such “paradigm shifts” have substantially altered that being interwo-
ven of theory and experiment, so that it seems almost impossible to crack that 
circle and to attempt a sort of internal reform of Physics.
In all branches of Physics, the experimenter shapes in six intertwined 
ways the performance of an experiment:
1. The experimenter chooses two material things. By doing so, he gives 
them a preferential position with respect to the rest of the world. At 
the same time, he assigns them the functions ‘object’ and ‘experi-
mental apparatus’ in an experiment to be carried out by him. In doing 
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so, he chooses between two alternatives by determining which of the 
two sides should be considered the object and which the apparatus. 
The two possible attributions of ‘object/apparatus’ to the two sides 
exclude each other, in the same experimental process. Neither the 
categories ‘object’ and ‘apparatus’ nor the subsequent choice of one 
of the two alternatives have a foundation in nature. They have their 
exclusive roots in the interests of the experimenter-investigator.
2. The experimenter puts spatial limits to experiments, even though 
their real connection with the rest of the world continues unaltered. 
But that real connection gets lost in the theory.
3. The experimenter stops his intervention by his own initiative. Only 
this makes possible a result, though at the expenses of separating it 
from the “ongoing flow of nature”.
4. The experimenter mentally isolates part of the experiment from the 
whole, i.e. the result, by abstracting from the process the termination 
of which brings about that result. Exceptions are instantaneous pro-
cesses (particle decays and -reactions), because there the process is 
identical with its result.
5. The experimenter almost entirely abstracts from the apparatus after 
having used it by attributing the result to the object only instead of 
equally to both sides. This has no foundation in nature, but exclusi-
vely in the experimenter-investigator’s interests.
6. The experimenter weakens the relevance of the observations conco-
mitant to the experiment and often replaces experiences by results 
of experiments (e.g., the colours seen by wave lengths measured). 
Through the concomitant observations, it is known that the reductio-
nisms (i) – (v) are precisely this: reductionisms.
None of the experimenter’s six interventions corresponds to anything in 
nature. The results of investigation obtained under such conditions do not 
refer to the true nature, but rather to its reductionist picture. The reductionist 
picture is successful, but not true, rather a lack of truth. In a nutshell: the ma-
jor part of abstractions and rearrangements consists in (a) mentally cutting off 
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the two sides of an experiment from the “rest of the world” and (b) abstrac-
ting from the apparatus after having read off a result and attributed it to the 
object alone. This unequal treatment is an infraction of the equal situation of 
both object and apparatus in reality. At first sight, the six interventions seem 
to add something to the true picture of nature. But in reality, all these inter-
ventions cause losses in the knowledge of material reality. They give rise to 
section IV, which addresses the question of how these losses can be somehow 
controlled. More details can be found in (Larenz, 2013; 2017; 2019).
The influence of the key words ‘success’, ‘model’ and ‘reductionism’ on 
the intellectual physiognomy of Physics can be summarized as follows:
1. Physics is not aiming at truth, but at success. Nevertheless, the su-
ccess is a true one.
2. In order to achieve that success, Physics does not focus on real ma-
terial things, but fabricates abstract models of those material things. 
Such models are not uniquely determined and, thus, more or less hy-
pothetical. Additionally, these models abstract from the major part of 
reality in order to investigate the remains. Furthermore, they use to 
make major simplifications. These abstractions and simplifications 
are losses for the pretended knowledge of material realities, i.e. they 
make impossible to achieve a full knowledge of what material things 
are and why and how they behave as they do. In other words, they 
are reductionisms.
3. The hypothetical character of those models as well as their lack of 
correspondence to the material reality prepares the way for an ever 
increasing skepticism.
The success of the reductionisms might easily make this assessment look 
too negative. But precisely the success is obtained at the expenses of truth, 
and it is not at all proven whether renouncing of the reductionisms would not 
yield the same, if not more, success. As has already been mentioned in the 
preview, Physics has grown out from the old philosophy of nature, which in 
turn “moves” within Natural Realism. This is why we are going to outline 
also the basic features of
19
Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a christian?
1.2. Natural Realism
Representatives of Natural Realism are Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and 
their disciples through the centuries. One should leave aside, however, tho-
se who call themselves either transcendental or analytical Aristotelians and 
Thomists. The reason is, to my mind that, on the one hand, transcendental 
philosophers like Kant have made a “critical turn” away from natural Rea-
lism. On the other hand, analytical philosophers have made what they call a 
“linguistic turn” which, by and large, passes by sense experience without ru-
ling it out by seeing thought and language in a tight parallel: “The basic tenet 
of analytical philosophy, common to such disparate philosophers as Schlick, 
early and late Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Ayer, Austin, Quine and Davidson, 
may be expressed as being that the philosophy of thought is to be equated 
with the philosophy of language; more exactly: (i) an account of language 
does not presuppose an account of thought, (ii) an account of language yields 
an account of thought, and (iii) there is no other adequate means by which an 
account of thought may be given” (Dummett, 1981, p. 39).
It is important to note that Natural Realism is more comprehensive than 
any particular consistently formulated building of metaphysical thought, like 
what we encounter in Aristotle’s thought of the metaphysical categories of 
substance and accidents, and the principles of act and potency that are en-
countered, for instance, in the hylomorphic structure of material things. Or 
what we encounter in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who formulated a sort 
of synthesis of the Aristotelian metaphysical view with the notion of parti-
cipation inspired by Plato. Conversely, Natural Realism cannot be defined 
by placing it into a more comprehensive category of human knowledge. The 
reason simply is, that Natural Realism itself does not exclude any sector of 
human knowledge. Accordingly, Natural Realism can be described somehow 
by saying that it does not put any preliminar condition to philosophical inqui-
ry and is careful to not leave out anything that comes before the mind’s eyes.
There are many philosophers, who follow, to one degree or another, the 
spirit of Natural Realism. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that a 
person normally is brought up in the mindset of Natural Realism without his 
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parents need to make any decision to do so. That is to say that Natural Rea-
lism is not just one philosophical position besides others that can be chosen 
from a philosophical no mans land. It has a priority, not only in a temporal 
sense, but also in the sense of being present in any philosophical position. 
Even if somebody turns away from this connatural intellectual stance, her 
or she must decide to do so and, despite of that, can never completely lea-
ve Natural Realism. The philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) is an 
example, insofar he adhered during the first part of his philosophical career 
the Neo-Kantian school of Marburg, but then left it in order to embrace a 
position which is close to, though not identical with Natural Realism (Har-
tmann, 1965, p. 133–135).
The most characteristic feature of Natural Realism is that a person living 
within the spirit of Natural Realism is convinced, without a need of decision, 
that he or she perceives and understands something real, i.e. independent 
of him or her. In doing so, he or she becomes aware of the own perceiving 
and thinking. Therefore, a natural realist is also convinced, explicitly or im-
plicitly, that he or she does not primarily perceive own perceptions of the 
senses and does not primarily think own thoughts. He does not need to fa-
bricate representations of what he thinks might stand behind his perceptions 
and thoughts – the “outer world”. A natural realist is in intimate contact with 
what he comes to call reality, based precisely on that contact.
From what has been said about Physics and Natural Realism, it follows 
that the mindset of Physics and the mindset of Natural Realism are distant 
from each other like models of natural processes are distant from the same 
processes as perceived by an observer. However, the situation becomes com-
plicated insofar models have their place in Natural Realism, if they serve a 
practical or technological goal, while they have no place at all in Natural 
Realism, if they are meant to mentally replace the perceived or experien-
ced reality. Both aspects are not completely separable, which makes that the 
mindsets or intellectual climates of Physics and Natural Realism are at odds 
in principle, albeit to a variable degree, depending on whether a particular 
topic is more practical or more theoretical.
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1.3. Theology
Except the short remarks in the introduction, no reference has been made 
to the question of whether and how the lack of harmony between the episte-
mological climate of Physics and that of Natural Realism has an effect on a 
professional of physics, if he happens to be a Christian. The core of the fol-
lowing considerations is that Christian revelation backs up Natural Realism. 
Therefore, if Physics is at odds with Natural Realism, it is also at odds with 
all that backs up Natural Realism, and with Christian revelation in particular. 
As a consequence, Physics is also at odds with Theology, understood as the 
discipline that expounds Christian revelation. The following considerations 
try to explain why and how Christian revelation backs up Natural Realism.
Christian revelation and, thus, Christian Theology focuses on God and 
on man and the world insofar they are related to God. That means before 
anything else, that man and the world are created by God, and it belongs 
to Theology to make it explicit that Creation is an exclusive action of God. 
From this point of view, Theology also speaks about the same material things, 
which Natural Realism and Physics are dealing with. Natural Realism does it 
in a way open to philosophy of nature, and Physics by investigating what is 
called laws of nature. In other words, Theology, Natural Realism and Physics 
have a common object, which they deal with in qualitatively different ways.
From the perspective of Theology, Natural Realism and Physics are kinds 
of knowledge of certain created things. These two branches of knowledge 
are acquired by humans, i.e. other creatures, by their own cognitive capaci-
ties. Theology, in turn, is a knowledge, “hosted” by human creatures as the 
two others, but essentially, though not exclusively, based on the Creator’s 
revelation. It refers to both the Creator and His creatures, in particular, ma-
terial things. Therefore, the theological knowledge about the common object 
(material things) is qualitatively different from the knowledge acquired by 
Natural Realism and acquired by Physics. Also the two latter are qualitatively 
different from each other.
A simple instance for these differences is the analysis of material things, 
from the point of view of philosophy of nature, as things that possess certain 
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qualitative and quantiative properties, from the point of view of Physics as 
things the properties of which obey certain laws of nature, where these laws 
involve certain quantities that can be subjected to experimental scrutiny, in 
particular to measurement. Theology, in turn, speaks of material things and 
their properties as created. Obviously, no contradiction arises so far. The si-
tuation seems to change if one takes into account that Christian revelation 
makes historical assertions that involve material things (age of the Earth, the 
Flood). These historical assertions might be, and are, considered as related 
to certain laws of nature. But even though here have arisen the well known 
perplexities, it is difficult to interpret them as sharp contradictions.
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge and theological knowledge have been 
considered to be at odds with each other, and that for a longer time. The 
reason is that scientific knowledge can claim to be verifiable, while the his-
torical parts of theological knowledge rely, as all theological knowledge, on 
the authority of the revealing God. Obviously, here is a source of difficulties 
for a dialogue. But this situation also urges to investigate what is really going 
on. From the theological point of view, the source of theological knowledge, 
i.e. God himself, does neither err nor deceive nor change. Therefore, the con-
clusion seems to be unavoidable that any at odds –situation between theology 
and scientific knowledge is due to the latter.
However, things are not that simple. At this point, the distinction between 
Christian revelation and Theology that expounds it, is relevant. As the Ga-
lilei controversy shows, theology cannot be entirely equated with Christian 
revelation. On the one hand, God uses, during a certain period, human me-
ans in order to convey his revelation to humans, and this revelation remains 
fixed in history. On the other hand, Theology is made by humans, who are 
children of their time and culture. In other words, in trying to expound God’s 
revelation, theology certainly relies on the perennial tradtion of language, ge-
neral historical knowledge and human wisdom. But besides these necessary 
elements, theology is always influenced by temporal elements that arise in a 
given epoque and might fade away centuries later. Therefore, the conclusion 
suggested in the previous paragraph about the cause of at odds – situations 
between theology and scientific knowledge does not seem to be so clear.
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In order to explore the situation in more detail, we propose three things:
(i) leave aside all sort questions about historical or otherwise individual 
material things or events;
(ii) leave aside all Natural Sciences except Physics, and
(iii) take into account what has been said above about ‘reductionisms’ in 
Physics.
In fact, every attempt to amend the relationship between Physics and The-
ology will have to address those reductionisms. This yields a sort of strategy, 
which is ultimately based on the difference that Physics has a picture of ma-
terial things thanks to certain reductionisms, while Theology does not make 
such reductionisms at all. In other words, they have not any longer the same 
object, which severely limits the possibilities of dialogue.
After having sketched the relationship between Physics and Theology, we 
should do the same with Natural Realism and Theology. First of all, it calls 
attention that the biblical text contains notions such as Creator, God, create, 
image (Gen 1: 26.27), Soul, Angel, Bread of life, living Bread, Holy Spirit, 
Father, and many others. They are not isolated pieces like a foreign body 
in a living organism, but semantically and inseparably interwoven with the 
surrounding text made of every-day’s language. Even much more: on every 
page, the mystery of God shines through in an unspeakable way. Further-
more, there is an analogical meaning of material things for the Kingdom of 
Heaven (for instance the pearl, the treasure, etc., cf. Mt 13) as well as, for ins-
tance, the sacramental meaning of water in Baptism. Altogether, there exists 
a most intimate co-presence of natural language and reality and biblical-the-
ological language and reality. One might say that the use of human means of 
communication is a sort of “natural” way God has chosen to reveal himself.
Another important point must be stressed: the God of Christian revelation 
is the God of truth and, thus, of intrinsic intelligibility. The Old Testament 
precedes God’s self-revelation through His Son (Hebr 1: 2), and the New 
Testament follows this self-revelation, which was already prepared in the Old 
Testament (cf. Lk 24: 27; Jo 5: 39). Furthermore, the Son indicates as reason 
for that He calls the apostles ’friends’ that He has made them know all that He 
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has heard from His Father (cf. Jo 15: 15; Mt 11: 25). And the Son promises 
the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, who will bring to their 
remembrance all that He has said to them (cf. Jo 14: 17; 15: 26.27; Jo 16: 13). 
The triune God is the God of truth, communication and transparence.
On the other hand, ordinary language and the philosophical stance that 
belongs to it, namely Natural Realism, carry the insight that natural things 
possess an intrinsic intelligibility. Therefore, Natural Realism extends to any 
other sort of (purely human) knowledge and cannot be left behind in order to 
step over, for instance, to an artificial language and a purely immanent repre-
sentation of what the subject conceives as real. Taking into account that God 
uses ordinary human language in order to convey His revelation, it follows 
that Christian Theology and Natural Realism are intimately related with each 
other. Both cannot be separated from each other.
Notice that the intelligibility first belongs to the objects of the domain of 
knowledge in question. However, as the term ‘intelligibility’ refers also to 
the mind that “hosts” the knowledge in question, the notion of intelligibility 
refers inseparably to both object and subject of knowledge. Here, the object 
has a logical priority: the mind can have an insight into the object, because 
the object is intelligible. All these are insights of Natural Realism.
Altogether, the considerations of the first part of this section II yield that 
Physics does not harmonize with Natural Realism, even though the latter 
remains somehow present in Physics. On the other hand, Natural Realism 
is in harmony with Christian Theology, even though natural language and 
Realism, on the one hand, and biblical-theological language and reality, on 
the other, are not identical, because the latter’s object is larger. All this provi-
des an answer to the question formulated at the beginning of the subsection 
II.3 Theology, namely whether and how the lack of harmony between the 
epistemological climates of Physics and Natural Realism has an effect on a 
professional of physics, if he happens to be a Christian. It does have an effect, 
which is that Christian revelation corroborates the gap existing in the same 
person’s mind between the epistemological climates of Physics and Natural 
Realism. This is rather detrimental than anything else.
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*
Before dealing with the question of how to react to this finding, three per-
tinent statements of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church might be quoted 
for supporting the view of the relationship between Christian revelation and 
Natural Realism just proposed. The first statement stems from the Encyclical 
Fides et ratio (FR, 1998) by Pope John Paul II. In the final part of this docu-
ment, the Pope encourages scientists, to do their science within a “sapiential 
horizon” (FR 106, 2). While it is not made explicit in that passage, what 
precisely this sapiential horizon is, it is clear that natural sciences are situated 
within such a horizon, which excludes the alternative that natural sciences 
themselves constitute such a sapiential horizon.
Now, the text of Fides et ratio as a whole presents a positive view of the 
human capacity of insight, which means above all other things a metaphysi-
cal knowledge, and a metaphysics of being. It is worth wile noting that Fides 
et ratio uses the term ‘metaphysics of being’ and its equivalents 23 times 
(Knasas, 2000). This is why scholars have qualified this Encyclical as the 
first document of the Magisterium that does not only recommend that phi-
losophers and theologians draw their leading ideas from a realist philosophy 
(and theology) in general and that of Thomas Aquinas in particular but, spe-
cifically, by a realist metaphysics. Therefore, it can be concluded that Natural 
Realism is the main piece of the sapiential horizon mentioned in FR 106, 2. 
In other words, it is Natural Realism that should be the philosophical frame 
for the natural sciences. As we have seen, at present it is not.
The second magisterial statement consists of three passages taken from 
the address of Pope John Paul II on 23.4.1993, shortly after the publication, 
by the Pontifical Biblical Commission, of the document The Interpretation 
of the Bible in the Church. One of the main ideas of the address is the “har-
mony between Catholic exegesis and the Mystery of Incarnation“ (section 2). 
Among the passages relevant for the relationship between Theology and Nat-
ural Realism are, above all, the following three. In these passages, the expres-
sion ’human language’ should be understood as parallel to ’Natural Realism’: 
“The God of the Bible is not an absolute Being who, crushing everything 
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he touches, would suppress all differences and all nuances. On the contrary, 
he is God the Creator, who created the astonishing variety of beings “each 
according to its kind”, as the Genesis account says repeatedly (Gen 1). Far 
from destroying differences, God respects them and makes use of them (cf. 
1 Cor 12: 18.24.28). Although he expresses himself in human language he 
does not give each expression a uniform value, but uses its possible nuances 
with extreme flexibility and likewise respects its limitations. (…) None of 
the human aspects of language can be neglected” (No. 8). And on the other 
hand: “The Sacred Books cannot be likened to ordinary writings, but, since 
they have been dictated by the Holy Spirit himself and have extremely seri-
ous contents, mysterious and difficult in many respects, we always need, in 
order to understand and explain them, the coming of the same Holy Spirit, 
that is, his light and grace, which must certainly be sought in humble prayer 
and preserved by a life of holiness” (no. 9).
These statements acquire their full weight by the parallelism between that 
the Son of God has become man, on the one hand, and that God’s revelation is 
expressed in human language, on the other. This is how John Paul II puts it in 
the same address: “The strict relationship uniting the inspired biblical texts with 
the mystery of the incarnation was expressed by the Encyclical Divino afflante 
Spiritu in the following terms: “Just as the substantial Word of God became like 
man in every respect except sin, so too the words of God, expressed in human 
languages, became like human language in every respect except error” (EB, 
559). Repeated almost literally by the Conciliar Constitution Dei Verbum (13), 
this statement sheds light on a parallelism rich in meaning” (no. 6).
The third statement is more specifically Catholic, for it concerns the as-
sertion that a natural theology is possible. The formulation of the First Vati-
can Council’s Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius is short: “The (…) Church 
holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known 
with certitude by the natural light of human reason from created things, “for 
the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, 
being understood by the things that are made” (Rom 1: 20)” (Denzinger-
Hünermann, 1991, no. 3004). This sober assertion can be circumscribed in 
a somewhat narrative manner by saying that Christian Revelation gives to 
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understand that it is possible that a healthy person, who has got normally de-
veloped cognitive capacities, but lacks even the faintest idea about Christian-
ity, is able to come, by his or her own intellectual resources, to the following 
insight: it is adequate to shape a proper concept for expressing the innermost 
state of the things of this world. If that person would encounter later the real 
Christianity, it would become clear to him or her that that new concept is 
equivalent to ‘creation’ or ‘create’, and that the inference to the existence of a 
Creator is true. It must be specified that the Church does not say that the pos-
sibility has or will become reality. It is rather a statement about the harmony 
between our world’s being created and its intrinsic intelligibility, on the one 
hand, and the human mind’s cognitive capacities, on the other.
Most probably, theologians like Karl Barth would denie the possibility 
of such a natural theology. We need not go into details here, because we 
are not concerned with natural theology. But the Catholic position somehow 
supports what has been said so far about the should be-relationship between 
Christian Theology, Natural Realism and Physics. Such a corroboration goes 
like this: the possibility of a natural theology allows the conclusion that the 
laws of nature are not necessarily a product of the model maker’s genius, but 
might well stem from just those material things the behaviour of which they 
describe. This does not exclude a contribution of the model maker’s genius, 
but it is not the essential part.
It is as if Christian revelation said: “it is almost “forbidden” to use the 
Bible as a source of scientific information. While the Christian revelation 
has very little to offer with respect to the particularities of the laws of nature, 
it has very much to offer with respect to the intelligibility of the things of 
this world and the human mind’s cognitive capacities. It is as if Christian 
revelation gave to understand: “scientists, trust your eyes and your mind! 
Through them you are in contact with reality!” It encourages somehow to not 
ultimately rely on reductionisms, but to trust that the full material reality will 
disclose itself to the human mind. This corroborates a mindset that tries to 
assimilate that reality, rather than to intervene by introducing reductionisms. 
Others than Christians do not know that, and they more easily assimilate less 
critically the intellectual climate which they are born into.
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Taking both sections I and II together, one can say that: First, present day 
Physics essentially involves models for prediction, at the cost of making severe 
reductionisms. Models and reductionisms are bound together by the requirement 
of success, but they reduce the intelligibility of the processes investigated. This 
has led physicists to be rather sceptical about the intelligibility of material things. 
Second, Natural Realism tries to avoid all sort of reductionisms in order to do 
justice to the whole reality. Third, Christian theology supports Natural Realism 
by asserting the intelligibility of material things and the human mind’s capacity of 
insight. Therefore, the “intellectual climates” of physics, on the one hand, and of 
Natural Realism and Catholic Theology, on the other, do not match. This situation 
is not at all satisfactory, and attempts to amend it are more than desirable. 
Unfortunately, the pertinent public discussions persistantly ignore that 
knowledge depends of the intelligibility of the object of knowledge. Intelli-
gibility is inherent to any reality whatsoever that can be known by a human 
mind. In the particular case of the common object of Physics and Theology, 
namely all material things, the intelligibility of these things “shows up” in 
both of Physics and Theology, modulated by the method and procedures of 
each of them. Admittedly, this is a difficult philosophical topic, and it might 
seem easier to focus on particular questions such as the age of the Universe, 
the beginning and development of the Universe, the age and development of 
the Earth and the historicity of the Flood.
But before these problems can be properly addressed, it is necessary to 
make sure that both Physics and Theology refer to the same object without 
reductionisms and with a common view of the object’s intelligibility. 
Obviously, this would require a Physics without reductionisms. This would 
most probably put in quarantine the true successses of Physics as it is done 
to date, which is not really desirable. Instead, one could envisage a Physics 
enriched with a sort of metatheory where the reductionisms are absent from 
the very outset. This possibility offers a new assessment of the curious fact 
that Theology is urged to assimilate scientific ways of thinking. As this sort of 
pressure on Theology is not any longer a minor phenomenon, we will briefly 
address it in the following section III, before we return to some details of the 
idea of enriching Physics in section IV.
29
Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a christian?
2. The pressure on Theology
In order to substantiate the claim insinuated in this section’s title, we es-
sentially present some titles and quotations from different authors. Although 
the phenomenon involves all natural sciences, we limit ourselves to quota-
tions related to Physics. Titles and quotations are so eloquent that, for our 
purposes, a detailed evaluation seems to be unnecessary. Taken together, they 
give to understand that Christian Theology and Physics do not only relate 
to each other in an unharmonious way, but that there is a sort of pressure on 
theologians exercised by physicists in the name of Physics in order to get 
Theology adapted to the mindset of Physics.
In fact, one finds countless publications with titles that express in one or 
other way the wish to introduce the intellectual climate of natural science 
into Theology. Take, for instance, the title The Hidden Face of God. Science 
Reveals the Ultimate Truth (Schroeder, 2002). A major title in this context is 
A Scientific Theology in three volumes dedicated to, respectively, ‘Nature’, 
‘Reality’ and ‘Theory’. Its author is the Anglican theologian and former biop-
hysicist Alister McGrath. It is not a text book of dogmatic or moral theology, 
but presents an attempt of bringing together both natural sciences and theolo-
gy (McGrath, 2001–2003). As the cover text explains, “the first volume sets 
out a vision for a “scientific theology” in which the working assumptions of 
the natural sciences are critically appropriated as a theological resource”. The 
cover text continues: “[A]s a whole, A Scientific Theology is the most exten-
ded and systematic exploration of the relation between Christian theology 
and the natural sciences ever undertaken”. But to make working assumptions 
is an essential part of the mindset of scientists, much less of theologians.
Another sort of attempt to seek harmony between Physics and Theolo-
gy consists in the view that object and method of Theology are such that it 
could contribute to the solution of problems, which (to date) have not, or 
not completely, been solved by Physics. This stance leads immediately to 
problem settings like the following: “We investigate the problem whether 
physics – which is understood here as the most general and most abstract 
field in science can lead to questions which cannot be answered within the 
methodological framework of physics alone and which could perhaps be ans-
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wered in the context of theology. Many prominent scientists of the 20th cen-
tury, e.g. Einstein, Jordan, Weinberg, and Hawking have seriously discussed 
this conjecture. The question (…) will be investigated here first for classical 
mechanics, in particular with respect to the problem of a complete determi-
nism in the sense of Laplace and its refutation in the 20th century. Second we 
discuss quantum mechanics with respect to the uncertainty relation, the pro-
blem of objectification and the complete loss of classical determinism and its 
replacement by statistical causality. Third we consider relativity, in particular 
relativistic quantum cosmology. Here we are confronted with the problem 
of the origin of the universe, the big bang and the problem of the creatio ex 
nihilo. It was argued very often by physicists and philosophers of science that 
for a complete explanation of this process a creator of the universe must be 
presupposed” (Mittelstaedt, 2004, Abstract).
There are certainly more ways of conflating both branches of knowledge. 
On the other hand, there has also been proposed a solution to avoid from the 
outset divergence and possible conflicts altogether. It is the idea of NOMA 
(= Non Overlapping MAgisteria) proposed by the evolutionary biologist and 
historian of science Stephen Jay Gould (1941–2002): “The net of science 
covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work 
this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral mea-
ning and value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass 
all inquiry (consider, for starters, the magisterium of art and the meaning of 
beauty). To cite the arch cliches, we get the age of rocks, and religion retains 
the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and they determine how to go 
to heaven” (Gould, 2002).
But theology is not only, and not primarly, about moral meaning and 
value but, above all, about God and His providence for the entire creation. 
NOMA would deprive God from giving things the laws of nature He esteems 
convenient. That is to say, NOMA would empty the concept of creation re-
ducing it to mere ‘existence’. That would be a heavy intervention of Science 
in Theology, which is precisely what NOMA claims it has set out to avoid.
Attempting to bring the mindset of the Natural Sciences to Theology and, con-
versely, expecting answers from Theology to problems posed by Science, in parti-
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cular Physics, and confining Theology to morals and meaning (NOMA) are three 
ways of influencing Theology from outside towards a direction different from that 
chosen by Theology itself. They are subtle forms of pressure motivated by success 
of a Natural Science. In fact, that success is true, but it does not follow that the 
Science which yields that success is true. Here we find that the difference between 
success and truth referred to in section II, is the ultimate reason that a pressure 
upon Theology from Natural Sciences has no foundation.
Not enough with that. Some authors do not hesitate to proclaim a sort of lea-
dership of natural sciences over theology. This claim is first advanced by scien-
tists. Here should be mentioned the view of Ian G. Barbour (1923–2013), who is 
praised by some people as one of the pioneers of the Science-Theology debate. He 
was a physicist and became later a protestant theologian: “Science and Religion 
are considered to be relatively independent sources of ideas, but with some areas 
of overlap in their concerns. In particular, the doctrines of creation and human na-
ture are affected by the findings of science. If religious beliefs are to be in harmony 
with scientific knowledge, more extensive adjustments or modifications are called 
for than those introduced by proponents of the Dialogue thesis. It is said that the 
theologian should draw from broad features of science that are widely accepted, 
rather than risk adapting to limited or speculative theories that are more likely to be 
abandoned in the future. Theological doctrines must be consistent with the scien-
tific evidence even if they are not directly implied by current scientific theories 
(…) God is not the transcendent Sovereign of classical Christianity. God interacts 
reciprocally with the world, an influence on all events though never the sole cause 
of any event” (Barbour, 2000, p. 35).
Surprisingly, the idea of the role of natural science as a “light house” for 
theology is supported also by theologians. This might be substantiated by two 
quotations; one from the reformed protestant theologian Thomas F. Torrance 
(1913–2007), the other from the well known Lutheran theologian Wolfhart 
Pannenberg (1928–2014). First, Torrance with a passage from the General 
Introduction that appears in every volume of a series initiated by him: “We 
must now reckon with a revolutionary change in the generation of fundamen-
tal ideas. Today it is no longer philosophy but the physical and natural scien-
ces which set the pace in human culture through their astonishing revelation 
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of the relational structures that pervade and underlie all created reality. At the 
same time, as our science presses its inquiries to the very boundaries of being, 
in macrophysical and microphysical dimensions alike, there is being brought 
to light a hidden traffic between theological and scientific ideas of the most 
far-reaching significance for both theology and science” (Torrance, 1989 ff., 
General Introduction).
This is neither a marginal nor an isolated phenomenon. Torrance is one 
of the 97 foundational members of the International Society for Science and 
Religion (2001; www.issr.org.uk), the founding president of which is the the-
oretical physicist and later Anglican pastor John Polkinghorne, Cambridge 
(UK). Other similar institutions are the Center for Theology and Natural Sci-
ences (Berkeley, California, www.ctns.org), the John Templeton Foundation 
(West Conshohocken, PA, USA, www.templeton,org), the Michael Faraday 
Institute for Science and Religion (Cambridge (UK), www.faraday-institute.
org), the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion (Oxford (UK), www.
ianramseycentre.info), the European Society for the Study of Science and 
Theology (ESSSAT, www.esssat.net), the Zygon Center for Religion and Sci-
ence (Chicago, www.zygoncenter.org). These and several others, of different 
background, are listed in the Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and 
Science (Rome, www.inters.org/websites).
Torrance’s stance is motivated by theological considerations which we need 
not examine here. Pannenberg’s theological views may differ from Torrance’s but, 
for a certain period of his life, he seems to have supported Torrance’s idea of in-
troducing into Theology the concept of ’field’, which certainly occupies a central 
position in modern Physics: “To Th. F. Torrance belongs the merit to have called 
attention – perhaps as the first – to these connections and to have pleaded for in-
troducing the concept of field into theology: “The field that we are concerned with 
is surely the interaction of God with history understood from the axis of Creation 
– Incarnation. (...) Our understanding of this field will be determined by the force 
or energy that constitutes it, the Holy and Creator Spirit of God” (Torrance, 1969, 
p. 71)” (Pannenberg, 1988, p. 102).
Pannenberg dedicates to the topic of the relationship between Theology and 
the Natural Sciences, in particular Physics, at least 26 of his 744 publications. 
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Except one or two previous publications, the first ones appear in the beginning 
of the 80’s and reach their zenit in the 90’s (Dienstbeck, without year). Thus, 
one may conclude that the relationship between Theology and the Natural Sci-
ences is for him an “important secondary topic”. A sample of Pannenberg’s ter-
minology in dealing with the concept of field is the following quotation (page 
numbers refer to volume I of his Systematische Theologie): “The assertion that 
the turning of modern Physics to field theories of ever more natural phenomena 
has an implicit theological relevance is suggested by the metaphysical origin 
of the concept of field. The idea of a field of forces can be traced through the 
Stoa back to the presocratics. Insofar as the concept of field corresponds to the 
old doctrines of pneuma [spirit], it is not at all nonsensical, but rather suggested 
by the history of concepts and mind, to put into relation the field theories of 
modern Physics with the Christian doctrine of the dynamical operations of the 
divine pneuma in the creation. As a matter of fact, such reasons for introducing 
the concept of field into theology have taken place in the framework of the 
doctrine about God, namely linked to the interpretation of the traditional way 
of speaking about God as about a Spirit” (Pannenberg, 1988, p. 101–104). A 
similar language is used in (Pannenberg, 1996, p. 257–260).
It goes without saying that, for a Christian, such views as those formula-
ted by Barbour, Torrance and Pannenberg are highly problematic. The most 
important reason for it is that Theology develops in a homogeneous way, 
because it is based on God-given revelations, and God does neither err nor 
change over time. Physics, in turn, as any human science, is based on human 
experience and reason, and these capacities are subject to the possibility of 
error. and change. As is well known, Physics has experienced several “para-
digm shifts”.
These quotations may be sufficient to show that there does exist a pressu-
re on theology, stemming from the natural sciences. We have limited oursel-
ves to Physics, but also Biology and Chemistry contribute to that pressure. It 
is hardly deniable that the omnipresent, though not always mentioned motive 
is the success of the natural sciences. More precisely, it is not these doctrines 
themselves which act upon each other, but human persons, theologians and 
scientists, which relate in a personal way to both doctrines and exercise their 
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influence, according to their personal views and motives, on other scientists 
and theologians. That interaction between theologians and scientists influen-
ces heavily the mindset of the general public. We face that pressure in every-
day’s life, even become aware of it in our own way of thinking, and witness 
it in the mindset of almost everybody else.
This pressure on Theology calls for a defence. Such a defence should 
take place in philosophical and, perhaps, in general physical terms, but not 
in theological terms. That does not make it impossible that such a defence is 
backed up by theological considerations, above all in the light of that both 
Christian revelation and Natural Realism assess the intelligibility of material 
things in similar terms. Therefore one might wonder whether the need of 
harmonization of the epistemological climates found in Physics, Natural Re-
alism and Christian Theology would be beneficial for that defence, too. At the 
end of section II, a Physics has been envisaged that is enriched with a sort of 
metatheory where the reductionisms are absent from the very outset. In other 
words, instead of changes in Theology, Physics turns out to be in need of flan-
king structures that control the systematic losses. Thus it is Physics instead of 
Theology which should turn into a “site under construction”.
3. On the defence of Theology by providing  
a control of the losses of Physics
In this final section we do not present an elaboration of a control of the 
cognitive losses of Physics, which arise from its methodical reductionisms. 
But we pretend to somehow prepare the ground for such an elaboration and 
add also some considerations about the persons who would do such a work. 
First of all, the control envisaged at the end of the previous section should 
take place neither in theological terms nor in terms of physico-mathematical 
theories, but in terms of philosophical Natural Realism. However, that does 
not make it impossible that the specific intelligibility of material things leads 
the philosophical reflection into areas closer to Mathematics and Theology.
One might wonder whether the harmonization of the present epistemological 
climates found in Physics and Christian Theology envisaged in section II would 
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also contribute to the control of the cognitive losses of Physics. The reason is sim-
ply that, according to section II, a low intelligibility of material things goes hand in 
hand with the reductionisms in Physics, while high intelligibility of material things 
goes hand in hand with the absence of such reductionisms. And ‘intelligibility’ is 
just another word for ‘epistemological climate’. Therefore, the starting point of 
elaborating the desired control definitely consists in not performing the known 
reductionisms in Physics from the very outset. Then, one is left with the common 
experience of our material world and with the task of reflecting on this experience 
in order to extract further insights.
The considerations of sections II and III make it quite clear that elabo-
rating a control cannot limit itself to minor re-arrangements, so to speak, to 
tactical manoeuvres. It must reach the very foundations. In other words, they 
must be, so to speak, a strategical manoeuvre. Any specification of such a 
manoeuvre should take into account the two following basic facts:
•	 Physics depends on the severe reductionisms sketched in section II, while 
Theology has no voluntarily made reductionisms such as Physics.
•	 Theology can grow, but only in a way that posterior stages are fully 
consistent with all previous ones. The reason is that a theologians 
understanding of God’s revelation can grow, but God is always iden-
tical with Himself. In contrast, Physics has already undergone several 
major changes “of paradigm” [the last two: determinism/indetermi-
nism (quantum theory), and the relativity of observer and observed 
(theories of relativity)]. Therefore, there is no problem at all if Phy-
sics would change once more.
In other words, Physics is envisaged to undergo another change of para-
digm, namely the change from doing Physics after the reductionisms without 
any control or estimate of the losses due to the reductionisms to doing Phy-
sics after the reductionisms, but together with the light of a control or estima-
te of the losses due to the reductionisms. With all certainty, the control would 
represent a pressure on Physics motivated from inside Physics. It remains 
to be seen, whether a Physics with an estimate of the losses would continue 
exercising undue pressures upon Theology.
36
Rudolf Larenz
Further considerations about how a control or estimate of the losses cau-
sed by the reductionisms of Physics could be established, do not belong to 
our topic. Some ideas one comes across on the way of elaborating such a 
control have been published elsewhere (Larenz, 2013; 2017; 2019). It goes 
without saying that such a task does not belong to any Church’s mission, but 
rather to competent professionals. However, given the typical uncertainties 
of an innovative approach to a difficult problem, the number of such profes-
sionals, who in fact would dedicate years and even decades to its solution, is 
quite reduced.
A final remark goes to the persons who unite in their mind the way of 
thinking of both Physics and Theology. Christians who happen to be physi-
cists will feel both the difference of epistemological climates and the pressure 
upon Theology in a more intense way, because difference and pressure stem 
from their own professional environment. Still more: if a physicist wants to 
be competitive, he or she must work according to the present-day standards 
of Physics and, in so doing, somehow interiorize the disharmony of episte-
mological climates.
If he or she is a Christian, the pressure upon Theology inevitably accom-
panies the professional mindset. In particular, such a physicist is obliged to 
do the professional work as if he or she were convinced that nature is unin-
telligible, while he is, by Common Sense (backed up by Faith), convinced 
that nature is intelligible. In doing so, he is creating a certain internal contra-
diction in his mind and continues maintaining it. In this way, he contributes 
to perpetuate the spirit of the present standards of Physics, in himself and in 
his professional environment.
It is true that this situation does not affect in equal degree every single 
physicist, but the basic situation is nevertheless the same for everybody: for 
a present day physicist, it is not so easy to be genuinely a Christian, because 
he or she is, first, burdened by the lack of epistemological harmony between 
Physics and Natural Realism, which in turn is backed up by Christian re-
velation. Second, a present day physicist who happens to be a Christian, is 
exposed to an atmosphere of estrangement from and pressure upon Theology.
37
Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a christian?
Bibliography
Barbour, I. G. (2000). When Science meets Religion. Enemies, Strangers or Partners? 
New York: Harper Collins Publishers LLC. 
Barr, S. M. (12003; 22016). Modern Physics and Ancient Faith. Indiana, South Bend: 
University of Notre Dame Press. Also: The Believing Scientist. Essays on Science 
and Religion. (2016). Michigan: Eerdmans Publishers, Grand Rapid. 
Dennin, M. B. (2015). Divine Science. Finding Reason at the Heart of Faith. Cincin-
nati OH, USA: Franciscan Media.
Denzinger, H.-H., P. (ed.). (1991). Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declara-
tionum de rebus fidei et morum (Latin and German). Freiburg i.B., Herder, The 
Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius is located at the marginal numbers 3001–3020. 
English text online: www.inters.org/Vatican-Council_I-Dei-Filius/.
Dienstbeck, S. Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von Wolfhart Pannenberg 1953–2009, 
without year. The Bibliographie is published by the Pannenberg-Forschungsstelle of 
the Hochschule für Philosophie, München (www.hfph.de) and accessible online: hfph.
de/forschung/wissenschaftliche-einrichtungen/religionsphilosophie/pannenberg-for-
schungsstelle/bibliographie-pannenberg-1953-2008.pdf. Retrieved 10.12.2019. This 
bibliography has the following publications on the topic of the relationship between 
Theology and the Natural Sciences: Nr. 200, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie 
(1973), 267, 320 (1980) 342, 344, 360 (1983), 395, 414 (1986), 423, 426, 452 (1989), 
454 (Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings, 1989), 470, 500 (Theol-
ogy and Science, 1992), 522, 544 (Theology of Cration and Natural Science, 1995), 
548, 549, 570 (1996), 581, 582, 584, 612 (1998), 657 (2001), 700 (2004), 715 (2006). 
Some particularly significant titles are mentioned explicitly. Translations, above all into 
English and Spanish, are counted extra.
Dummett, M. (1981, 21987). The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge Mass.
Gould, S. (2002). Jay: Text on NOMA: http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/
gould_noma.html. cf. also: idem, Rocks of Ages. Science and Religion in the Full-
ness of Life. New York: Ballentine Books. 
McGrath, A. (2001–2003). A Scientific Theology. Nature. Reality. Theory. Michigan: 
Eerdmans Publishers, Grand Rapid. 
Hawking, S., Mlodinow, L. (2010). The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the 
Universe. New York: Bantam Books (Random House). 
Hartmann, N. (1965). Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921). Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter. The passages quoted in the text are accessible online at: https://
books.google.fi/books?id=YaEhAAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_book_other_
versions. Retrieved 11.06.2019.
38
Rudolf Larenz
Hertz, H. (1899). The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London: 
Macmillan & Co. Ltd. German original 1894. Online: https://archive.org/details/
principlesofmech00hertuoft/page/xxviii. Retrieved 11.06.2019.
John Paul II. (1998). Encyclical Fides et ratio. www.Vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/
en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp_ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.htm/ Retrieved 
11.12.2019.
John Paul II. Address 23.4.1993 on The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church., in 
the context of the publication (15.4.1993) of a document with the same title, by 
the Pontifical Biblical Commission.
The English version of both texts seems to be unavailable on the Vatican’s internet 
page. Here are hints to find both texts online: a) searching in google with “John 
Paul II address on the interpretation of the bible in the church english“ one finds 
among the first entries: ’The Biblical Commission’s Document „The Interpre-
tation of the Bible…’; the proper address begins with ’www.google.books.lv/
books?id=5R’… b) The text of PBC at: www.catholic-resources.org/ChurchDocs/
PBC_Interp-FullText.htm, or at: www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research-sites/cjl/
texts/cjrelations/resources/documents/catholic/pbcinterpretation.htm. Retrieved 
12.08.2019.
Jordan, P. (51968). Der Naturwissenschaftler vor der religiösen Frage. Oldenburg: 
Stalling-Verlag. 
Kant, I. Versions A (1781); B (1787). Critique of pure Reason. Online www.earlymo-
derntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf. Instead of page numbers, there are 
indicated margin numbers, preceeded by A or B. Retrieved 12.08.2019.
Knasas, J. F. X. (2000). “Fides et Ratio” and the Twentieth Century Thomistic Re-
vival. New Blackfriars, Vol. 81, No. 955, September, p. 400–408.
Larenz, R. (2013). Does Physics need a Second Scientific Revolution? Christianity 
Encourages Tackling a Foundational Problem of Physics. International Journal 
of Sino-Western Studies, Vol. 4, p. 95–116. www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-
issues/. Retrieved 11.06.2019.
Larenz, R. (2017). Substance and Dynamics: Two Elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic 
Philosophy of Nature in the Foundation of Mathematics in Physics. Studia Gilso-
niana 6: 3, p. 451–483. Online www.gilsonsociety.com/files/451-483-Larenz.pdf. 
Retrieved 11.06.2019.
Larenz, R. (2019). On an Amendment of the Morality of a Physicist’s Professional 
Actions. An Element of Inculturation of Christianity into a Scientific-Technologi-
cal Civilization. Rodczniki Teologczne, T. LXVI, zeszyt 3, p. 51–67.
Mittelstaedt, P. (2004). On Possible Relations between Physics and Theology. In 
W. Löffler, P. Weingartner (eds.). Knowledge and Belief. Proceedings of the 26th 
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2003, öbv & hpt. Wien, p. 329–338.
39
Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a christian?
Pannenberg, W. (1988). Systematische Theologie, Bd. 1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht. The complete work has three volumes.
Pannenberg, W. (1996). Geist als Feld – nur eine Metapher? Theologie und Philoso-
phie, Vol. 71, p. 257–260. In the Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von W.P. 
(see Dienstbeck), this article has the number 570.
Popper, K. (11959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson & Co.; 
Routledge (Routledge Classics) (32002). German original: Logik der Forschung. 
Julius Springer, Wien (11935).
Schroeder, G. (2002). The Hidden Face of God. Science Reveals the Ultimate Truth. 
New York: Free Press (now Simon & Schuster). 
Torrance, T. F. (1969). Space, Time and Incarnation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Torrance, T. F. (1989 ff.). Series ’Theology and Science at the Frontiers of Knowl-
edge’. Initiated by Torrance, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, all volumes, 
General Introduction.
Summary
Natural Realism and Physics are two ways of relating to our material 
world. This article provides some basic characteristics of both and derives 
two joined reasons why Physics is, partially, at odds with Natural Realism. 
The first reason consists in that present-day Physics is based on models of 
reality which involve several severe methodical reductionisms. From that de-
rives the second reason, which is the difference of epistemological climates 
of Natural Realism and Physics. The difference is that the intelligibility of 
material things is esteemed low in Physics and high in Natural Realism.
Natural Realism suggests that it should be possible to overcome that un-
satisfactory state of affairs. As a way to amend the relationship, it is suggested 
as a goal to elaborate a certain control or estimate of the methodical losses 
of Physics due to its reductionisms (as long as Physics does not change its 
method). This control is elaborated in the spirit of Natural Realism. It is also 
expected to be helpful for achieving deeper insights within Physics.
The results of a Physics under reductionisms do not seem to harmonize 
with many data offered by the Bible about certain material and historical 
facts. On the other hand, the Bible is not a scientific protocol or text book. 
Both the differences between epistemological climates and between the pre-
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sentation of facts appear to bring about a sort of pressure upon theologians 
to assimilate the scientific way of understanding, because it is considered 
“successful”.
Though this pressure is partly exercised by scientists and partly even by 
theologians, i.e. by persons, one root of the pressure lies in the doctrines 
of Physics and Natural Realism as such, above all in the difference of their 
epistemological climates. Making disappear the difference of epistemologi-
cal climates will, therefore, lower the pressure. A first step towards that goal 
is the investigation of the consequences that emerge from renouncing of the 
reductionisms of Physics. As the reductionisms are recognized as such in the 
spirit of Natural Realism, any investigating the consequences of renouncing 
of them will equally take place in the spirit of Natural Realism.
Christian revelation endorses Natural Realism, when speaking of our ma-
terial world. Thus, it turns out that the philosophical solution of a problem of 
Physics in the spirit of Natural Realism has beneficial consequences also for 
the relationship of Physics to Christian Theology, and to Christianity in gen-
eral. It is a flanking aid to the inculturation of Christianity into a scientific-
technological civilization.
